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Currency market intervention–cum–reserve accumulation has emerged as the favored “self-
insurance” strategy in recipient countries of excessive private capital inflows. This paper argues 
that capital account management represents a less costly alternative line of defense deserving 
renewed consideration, especially in the absence of fundamental reform of the global monetary 
and financial order. Mainstream arguments in favor of financial globalization are found 
unconvincing; any indirect benefits allegedly obtainable through hot money inflows are equally 
obtainable without actually tolerating such inflows. The paper investigates the experiences of 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) in the global crisis and subsequent recovery, 
focusing on their respective policies regarding capital flows.   
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In 2008, the crisis at the core of global finance provoked a “sudden stop/reversal” in private 
capital flows toward emerging-market economies (EMEs). This followed a bonanza episode that 
saw at its final stage an unprecedented “decoupling” surge in 2007. While the global financial 
crisis (GFC) hit EMEs quite indiscriminately, differences were observed in relative vulnerability 
to the global shock. Similarly, while a “two-speed recovery” describes an important divide 
between EMEs and advanced economies in general, experiences among EMEs again show 
considerable diversity. Broadly speaking, the most important factors determining countries’ 
recovery fortunes were their precrisis external positions and their policy space, defining their 
respective scope for implementing stimulus measures. Countries that were dependent on 
external help (International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, etc) and export recovery generally 
fared worse. As financial globalization has severely reduced EMEs policy space and increased 
their vulnerability, the attractiveness of defensive macroeconomic policies designed to counter 
these adverse conditions rose accordingly.  
This paper investigates whether capital account management (CAM) may contribute to 
shoring up EMEs’ macroeconomic and financial stability and enlarging their policy space while 
avoiding the costs associated with “self-insurance” strategies. Focusing on the BRICs, insights 
concerning the design of effective capital account management regimes are sought. 
Section 2 critiques the idea of financial globalization as a development strategy 
supposed to foster catching up. While any supposed benefits may be illusory rather than real, 
financial globalization has important downsides: the periphery gets coupled to the monetary 
policy stance set at the center while risking financial instability through exposure to global 
financial conditions. Section 3 weighs the options available to EMEs in the light of the crisis 
experiences and global developments. Especially in the absence of fundamental reform of the 
international order, instead of taking recourse to self-insurance as the apparent default option, 
EMEs should explore CAM, the underlying rationale and principles of which are discussed in 






FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND US MONETARY POLICY 
 
In the 1980s, liberalizing financial markets including cross-border capital flows and asset 
holdings became a policy mantra around the world. Promoted by international organizations 
such as the IMF, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and 
European Union (EU), the “Washington Consensus” strongly influenced policies in many 
developing countries (Abdelal 2007). The main argument put forward for liberalizing capital 
flows stresses relative capital scarcity in poor countries, in the sense of a lack of domestic 
saving. By opening up their capital accounts, developing economies gain access to the large 
saving pool of advanced economies, allowing welfare-enhancing augmentations of their own 
insufficient home savings, supposedly leading to higher investment.   
Other promises feature enhanced microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic 
stability arising as so-called “indirect or collateral benefits” (Prasad and Rajan 2008). 
Microeconomic efficiency gains occur as developing economies’ incomplete and 
underdeveloped financial markets are exposed to foreign competition, with capital inflows 
driven by foreign expertise promoting efficiency in resource allocation. Competitive pressures 
and foreign expertise also deliver macroeconomic stability gains, as the presumed wisdom of 
markets disciplines policymakers and encourages better institutions and practices. As 
individuals and firms are offered an enlarged set of opportunities for risk diversification, 
economies are supposed to experience greater stability in consumption and investment. As a 
consequence of closing the supposed “saving gap” and obtaining guidance from “wise finance,” 
financially integrating developing economies experience rising investment rates and accelerated 
catching-up. “Cross-border flows spur growth and development, benefiting everyone” (BIS 
2011). 
At varying degrees, financial globalization has become a reality in many developing 
countries; welcomed by market players keen to explore the opportunities on offer in newly 
opened “emerging markets.” Actual outcomes have been sobering.  
Most irritating is the increased incidence of financial crises in EMEs in the era of 
unfettered global finance – until the early 2000s. Instead of gaining in efficiency and stability 
the experience of EMEs is scattered with gravely disruptive financial crises, often leaving 
permanent structural and socioeconomic scars in their trail (Ocampo and Stiglitz 2008). For 
what actually happens when a country opens up to global finance and becomes the target of 4 
 
capital flows is currency appreciation and a corresponding loss in competitiveness (Combes, 
Kinda, and Plane 2011). It is in this way that a current account deficit arises that makes the 
target country of private capital flows a recipient of foreign saving (in the ex-postnational 
income accounting sense). In a self-fulfilling and ultimately destabilizing fashion, rising asset 
prices and currency appreciation arouse herding among foreign investors financing the boom. 
Lured by higher prospective rates of return than seem available in home markets, risks may 
appear low for a while, especially since liberalized financial markets promise the option of 
getting out at any time. Typically, it is consumption spending (by the privileged few) rather than 
investment that gets stimulated through currency appreciation and rising asset prices – at least 
temporarily. Fragile financial structures and vulnerabilities build up through rising indebtedness 
as the bonanza runs its course and bubbles inflate – until they burst.  
Essentially, financial globalization means that the liberalizing developing country is 
losing both monetary policy autonomy and control over its financial system. Monetary policy 
space is lost as the EME can no longer pursue a monetary policy course that deviates from the 
global stance without risking provoking capital flows and exchange rate movements that might 
counteract its own policy intentions. At the same time, global financial conditions become freely 
transmittable to the domestic financial system through cross-border flows and dealings.  
The point is that there may be very good reasons for preventing the free transmission and 
arbitraging of financial conditions set elsewhere in the global economy, precisely because these 
conditions may not be equally appropriate for every country. Similarly, there may be very good 
reasons for countries not to be subjected to a monetary policy stance determined externally. Far 
from being an optimum currency area, subjecting the world economy to uniform monetary and 
financial conditions makes little sense.  
The promise of floating exchange rates as safeguarding countries’ policy space 
heroically presumes that well-behaved market forces would guarantee continuous international 
equilibrium (Friedman 1953, Johnson 1969). The evidence is otherwise: exchange rate 
movements neither compensate for inflation differentials, except for in the very long run, nor do 
floating currencies enjoy the degree of freedom under financial globalization implied by the 
“unholy trinity” (Tobin 1974, Edison 1987, Rogoff 1996, Taylor 2004). Over any policy-
relevant horizon, carry-trade asset market play attracted by interest rate differentials undermines 
policy autonomy, easily resulting in destabilizing currency market behavior. It is true that, 5 
 
ultimately, exchange rates are mainly driven by monetary policies rather than market forces, 
only that monetary policies were not all made equal.  
With the US dollar standing at the top of the international currency pecking order, US 
monetary policy effectively sets the benchmark for global monetary conditions. Strongly 
influencing exchange rates and global financial conditions, financial globalization actually 
maximizes the lead country’s financial fire power, mirrored by the loss in monetary policy space 
and control over domestic financial conditions in the liberalizing periphery.
1 Of course 
exchange rate movements and financial conditions as driven by the lead country’s monetary 
policy may be in conflict with local requirements in the periphery. In other words, a policy-
domain problem afflicts the financially globalized economy: the peculiar economic conditions 
ruling in the lead country largely determine global monetary conditions. 
For apart from possible contagion effects arising during crises, under noncrisis 
conditions, the typical EME’s influence on global monetary and financial conditions is 
negligible individually. An impact on global conditions may still arise indirectly in the 
aggregate though, especially through the following international trade feedback loop. A 
keenness to export, which is widespread in the periphery, will create a tendency for labor market 
weakness at the core, prompting monetary easing in an attempt to stimulate domestic demand at 
the core. It is in this indirect way that the periphery may exert some influence on global 
monetary and financial conditions, albeit without any guarantee that the outcome might really 
suit local requirements at any time. US monetary policy is set with a view to best meet US 
domestic requirements, but under financial globalization US monetary policy also sets the 
standard for global monetary policy.  
While these reflections on the global monetary and financial order already indicate that 
financial globalization may be a thoroughly bad idea, it is useful to investigate some broad 
trends and episodes since the rise in global finance in the 1990s.   
                                                            
1 There may be some secondary currencies with certain reserve currency qualities, enjoying some limited degree of 
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export in the periphery has important systemic implications, for it magnifies deflationary 
tendencies at the core and requires the reserve currency issuer to “overspend” (i.e., benignly 
neglect its current account deficit). This is the feedback loop through international trade 
mentioned above. Labor market weakness calls the Federal Reserve into action, enticing the 
needed (over-)spending.  
In turn, easy monetary conditions set at the center of the global financial system also 
provide the key push factor for capital flows. Similar to the first wave of the 1990s, the second 
capital flow bonanza headed toward EMEs, too, arose in an environment of easy money policies 
by the US Federal Reserve – prompted by cyclical weakness in the US economy. Feeding the 
periphery’s bloated self-insurance buffer, official recycling of private capital flows allows the 
extraction of a “premium” on the part of the reserve currency issuer (see below).
2  
Recipient countries face two principle policy choices in resisting currency appreciation 
arising from Federal Reserve easing. One is to simply follow suit – implying a complete loss of 
policy autonomy. The other is to try to recapture some policy space by currency market 
intervention in support of the dollar. As the second wave took off in earnest in 2002, the 
periphery’s response was a mixture of these two policy options, resulting in soaring FX reserve 
holdings – much in contrast to the 1990s. Dubbed the “global capital flows paradox,” arguably, 
the self-insurance boom of the 2000s also revealed a preference among EMEs to avoid 
multilateral insurance or, rather, conditionality (Summers 2006). 2007 became a record year for 
capital flows toward supposedly “decoupling” EMEs, with surging equity and commodity price 
indices and dollar weakness seen across the board.  
                                                            
2 The notion “exorbitant privilege,” as applied to the reserve currency issuer in the pre-financial globalization era, 
referred to the goods and services (trade deficit) or direct investments (private FDI outflows) enjoyed or acquired 
by the reserve currency issuer that had low-yielding official reserve holdings in the periphery as their counterpart. 
Financial globalization has expanded the opportunities for rent extraction on the basis of much larger gross capital 
flows meeting increased demands for safety in the periphery (Bibow 2010a). Typically, self-insurance reserve 
buffers imply the payment of a “premium” by self-insuring recipient countries. For instance, if the reserve currency 
is used as carry-trade funding currency, the intervening authorities in the recipient country effectively act as 
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WHERE TO GO FROM HERE 
 
EME’s options and their relative merit depend on global developments, the global monetary and 
financial order in particular. Enhancing collective insurance represents a straight forward way of 
making recourse to self-insurance less attractive. After all, the IMF’s core mandate features the 
provision of temporary financing to countries in balance of payments crisis. In the quiet years 
prior to the global crisis, the IMF seemed to be going out of business though (Kapur and Webb 
2006). The widespread shift in current account balances and surging reserve holdings reflected 
EMEs’ urge to avoid conditionality of emergency loans. IMF stand-by arrangements have made 
a comeback with the GFC in countries that had taken out insufficient self-insurance.  
At the London G-20 summit in April 2009, the IMF’s lending powers were trebled. The 
Fund doubled its general loan access limits for nonconcessional lending to 200 percent of quota 
per year and 600 percent cumulatively, and revamped its lending framework. A new “Flexible 
Credit Line” (FLC) instrument was launched, relying on ex ante rather than ex post 
conditionality, and a “Precautionary Credit Line” (PLC) was similarly designed as a 
precautionary lending facility for countries that do not quite meet strict ex ante conditionality, 
but qualify for “streamlined” ex post conditionality. While access to the FLC is determined on a 
discretionary basis by individual country financing needs, the PLC features a 10-times-quota 
access limit (see IMF 2009, 2010c). So far the new precautionary loan facilities have only met 
lackluster take-up. Pale in size compared to official reserve holdings of many emerging-market 
countries, they apparently represent insufficiently attractive collective alternatives to self-
insurance.  
As the Fund continues its internal reflection process and considers further reforms, this 
could raise the demand for the collective insurance services it was originally set up to provide 
(IMF 2010a,b). This is all the more important in view of the Fund’s broadened surveillance 
responsibilities that now include regular and mandatory financial stability assessments for 
members with systemically important financial sectors as well as “spill-over reports” (IMF 
2010d, 2011, UN 2011). Recent reforms to the Fund’s governance have increased EMEs’ quotas 
and board seats. By enhancing its global legitimacy, quota and voice reforms, too, should 
support a revival of the Fund’s global role. Overall, however, the reform impact will likely 
remain limited absent greater intellectual diversity (cf. United Nations 2010). Nor are the Fund’s 
increased lending powers (and occasional special drawing rights allocations) going to change 11 
 
the fact that in case of global financial contagion, it is the US Federal Reserve and Treasury 
rather than the IMF that have the systemic powers to act as international lender of last resort.
4  
The big issue looming in the background concerns global exchange rate arrangements 
and the US dollar. As the nation most likely to challenge US dollar supremacy in a decade or 
two, the Chinese authorities have already expressed some frustration in this regard. At the peak 
of the global crisis, Chinese central banker Zhou referred approvingly to Keynes’ original 
bancor plan for the Bretton Woods order, which did not foresee a special status for any national 
currency (Zhou 2009). More recently, on the eve of his state visit to Washington in mid-January 
2011, Chinese president Hu Jintao questioned the role of the US dollar in the global monetary 
order and was quoted saying “the current international currency system is the product of the 
past” (McGregor 2011). Just before the Seoul G-20 Summit in November 2010, US Treasury 
Secretary Geithner framed the issue somewhat differently, proposing current account caps.
5  
Starting from the proposition that exchange rates are inherently a multilateral affair, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) promotes the idea of 
establishing symmetrical exchange rate rules designed to maintain balanced trade (see 
UNCTAD 2010, for instance). At their summit in Seoul, G-20 leaders seemed to favor markets 
over intervention when they found words of support for more “market-determined” exchange 
rates and enhanced exchange rate flexibility, calling on their finance ministers and central bank 
governors to develop “indicative guidelines … to facilitate timely identification of large 
imbalances that require preventive and corrective actions to be taken” (G-20 Leaders 2010). 
Agreement on a set of indicators for this purpose was reached at the Paris G-20 Summit in 
February 2011, and the “Mutual Assessment Process” that was launched at the Pittsburgh 
Summit as part of the “G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth” is 
supposed to bring closure to this matter by the time of the Cannes Summit in November 2011.
6 
                                                            
4 Schinasi and Truman observe that the EU authorities appear to be particularly disinclined to expanding the IMF’s 
lending facilities, despite taking advantage of the increased flexibility of the IMF’s lending operations (2010).  
5 While the Chinese authorities initially appeared to be open to this proposal, greatest resistance came from another 
notorious current account surplus country: Germany (Barber, Peel, and Wiesmann 2010).  
6 The set of indicators that was agreed upon reads: “(i) public debt and fiscal deficits; and private savings rate and 
private debt (ii) and the external imbalance composed of the trade balance and net investment income flows and 
transfers, taking due consideration of exchange rate, fiscal, monetary and other policies” (G-20 2011). The 
“Multilateral Consultation on global imbalances” launched shortly before the global crisis was an earlier – 
unsuccessful – attempt to resolve the issue of global imbalances (IMF 2007b).  12 
 
Resolution by mutual accord is complicated by the fact that key players seem to fundamentally 
disagree on the underlying causes of unbalanced global economic trends and the role of 
economic policy (UNCTAD 2010).  
Reining in global finance represents another option for the global community to reduce 
the risk of financial instability, and thereby also the demand for self-insurance. Beliefs in market 
“self-regulation” have indeed lost in popularity and certain initiatives to that effect are under 
way, both at the global and national (or regional) levels. As agreed at the London G-20 Summit, 
a newly established “Global Stability Board” (GSB) has replaced the Global Stability Forum 
(GSF). The GSB’s core mandate is to support global financial stability by assessing 
vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and identifying and overseeing action 
needed to address them. Its membership was broadened beyond former GSF members and 
includes a group of larger EMEs. Meanwhile, in the US, the Dodd-Frank Act of July 2010 led to 
the establishment of a new Financial Stability Oversight Council with a mandate for 
macroprudential supervision. In the EU, new pan-European supervisory authorities for banking, 
insurance and securities markets as well as the European Systemic Risk Board, charged with 
macroprudential supervision and operating under the auspices of the European Commercial 
Bank, took up their work in 2011. At the global level, a “Basel 3” accord on (increased) bank 
capital standards was reached, newly featuring leverage and liquidity ratios as well. 
Implementation of reforms is still ongoing. There is growing resistance from interest groups, as 
many big players have grown even bigger since the global crisis.  
Overall, it seems questionable whether these initiatives will sufficiently tame global 
finance and reduce EMEs’ potential vulnerabilities arising from financial globalization. Reforms 
are merely adapting the pre-existing institutional framework without fundamentally challenging 
its intellectual presuppositions. Even if financial stability at the core improved, even bigger 
gambles might be put on when operating on EME turf, outside the purview of G-20 supervisors.   
With no fundamental reform of the global order in sight, recourse to self-insurance 
strategies remains EMEs’ default option. The crisis experience may further encourage this 
response. Some rather disconcerting facts exist though; to begin with, self-insuring countries 
were not spared infection and turmoil but, as innocent bystanders, got hit and participated in the 
global crisis. In the event, self-insurance merely provided some margin of safety enabling 
countries to avoid IMF rescue and securing some – varying – policy space for implementing 
countercyclical policies on their own (Bibow 2010b). 13 
 
Next, while only of limited effectiveness, self-insurance comes at a significant cost. 
Essentially, self-insurance has EMEs swap ownership of higher-yielding assets for lower-
yielding ones (Bibow 2008–9). This swap represents a nice bargain for international investors, 
even more so today when the monetary authorities in core advanced countries pursue “zero 
interest rate policies.” For recipient EMEs the ballooning volume of currency market 
interventions (and sterilization measures) required for containing upward currency pressures is 
raising the stakes. Failure to contain currency appreciation means being pushed back into the 
pre-1999 external deficit position; risking boom-bust cycles while stepping up their efforts 
through self-insurance means boosting the transfer of resources to rich countries (Bibow 2010a). 
Finally, there is the important systemic issue that EMEs’ pursuit of self-insurance requires a 
counterparty willing to underwrite insurance on demand. Essentially, reserve buffers provide 
some limited but costly protection, and without solving the underlying issue, which can only be 
addressed at the global level by reforming the global monetary order.
7 EMEs should explore 
CAM as an alternative to self-insurance.  
 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT: RATIONALE AND PRINCIPLES 
 
Rather than waiting for proper global reform while continuing to passively adapt to policies set 
at the center with only limited policy space reclaimed through costly self-insurance, EMEs may 
aim at keeping out what they do not need, namely through a CAM regime. IMF regulations 
actually allow for this possibility. OECD and EU regulations as well as bilateral agreements 
may present more of an obstacle. Arguably, flawed doctrines and vested interests are the most 
important hurdles to overcome.  
The aims of a CAM regime are threefold. The first objective is to safeguard financial 
stability by reducing exposure to unfettered global finance. Experience shows that global 
finance is far from benevolent and well-behaved. EMEs have every reason to contain risks 
arising from capital inflows that do not serve their development. The second objective is to 
safeguard macroeconomic stability and enlarge policy space. Given that the world is not an 
optimal currency area, delinking from global monetary and financial conditions as set at the 
                                                            
7 Regional pooling and lending arrangements among EMEs can only help limiting instabilities that arise within the 
region, but not extra-regional shocks hitting the whole region.  14 
 
center is the essence of the exercise. The third objective is to avoid the costs that arise by relying 
on self-insurance rather than CAM in the pursuit of the first two objectives.  
Note that the proposal here is for a permanent rather than a temporary regime and that 
the focus is on capital inflows rather than outflows.
8 Instead of blocking flighty outflows when 
crisis strikes, it makes far more sense to prevent financial vulnerabilities from arising in the first 
place, namely by blocking types of inflows that can easily turn flighty (Goodhart and Delargy 
1998). So the regime is to be selective as well, with CAM concerning both the composition of 
inflows as well as their aggregate volume (Bibow 2008–9).  
The “saving gap” idea is the key doctrinal flaw behind the financial globalization 
mantra. The mainstream (neoclassical) vision of capital accumulation has saving causing and 
somehow financing investment. This vision is utterly confused and thoroughly misleading. In 
monetary production economies capital is not saved and grown, but produced, with production 
requiring advance finance that allows paying the factors of production in monetary units before 
the output can be sold. Capital formation thus requires liquidity, as created and allocated by the 
financial system, rather than (ex ante) saving. “We have all been brought up … in deep 
confusion of mind between the demand and supply of money and the demand and supply of 
savings; and until we rid ourselves of it, we cannot think correctly,” as Keynes (1939) astutely 
observed on this crucial matter (see also Bibow 2009, Borio and Disyatat 2011, UNCTAD 
2006). The enlightened Keynesian vision therefore stresses that, while growth and development 
require investment, investment is driven by aggregate demand which, in turn, is susceptible to 
macroeconomic policies. In the context of developing countries in a globalized world, it is 
capital goods rather than “capital” that may need to be imported. Any need for external finance 
of domestic investment only arises if imports cannot be paid for by exports.  
Sufficient policy space for deliberate macroeconomic management in line with domestic 
requirements is thus vital. It is the lack of policy space entailed by financial globalization which 
tends to bias macroeconomic policies of EMEs towards (net) exports rather than domestic 
demand as their driver of growth. Ideally both fiscal and monetary policies should be tuned so 
as to be conducive to steady domestic demand growth, complemented by a competitive 
exchange rate that allows for the “payment” of imports by means of exports. In practice 
financial globalization relegates monetary policy to the passive adaptation to conditions set at 
                                                            
8 A recent mood change in the debate includes the IMF (see IMF 2010e and Ostry et al., 2010, 2011), showing 
greater tolerance of capital controls, albeit only as a last resort and as temporary measures.  15 
 
the center. While self-insurance may recapture some limited space for monetary policy, fiscal 
policy, too, tends to get subordinated to external conditions as (net) exports take on a 
superficially prominent role in aggregate demand.  
Importantly, criticizing export-led growth strategies for their neo-mercantilist character 
is beside the point when policies are chosen defensively as EMEs try to protect themselves 
against the hazardous environment that the international monetary (non-)order joined by 
unfettered global finance is posing to their development. That said, the relative success of neo-
mercantilism in EMEs certainly undermines the “saving gap” idea, which is contradicted by 
evidence showing that “developing countries that have relied less on foreign finance have grown 
faster in the long run” (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian 2007). It does not take tapping any 
foreign saving pool to grow and catch up. But it is indeed curious that development should come 
along with an uphill resource transfer, which is precisely what the current neoliberal global 
order is extracting from developing countries (cf. UN 2011).  
The “wise finance” idea behind the financial globalization mantra does not hold up to 
scrutiny either. Financial globalization allegedly improves institutions and practices in countries 
with underdeveloped financial markets, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources. 
While compelling empirical evidence in support of such “indirect benefits” does not exist, the 
point to emphasize here is that the alleged gains do not require hot money for their delivery 
anyway.  
Essentially, a CAM regime can be designed that refocuses the activities of central banks 
(and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)) in such a way as to capture the alleged microeconomic 
efficiency gains while avoiding the premium that is attached to self-insurance. Properly 
designed, any microeconomic benefits supposedly arising from hot money flows as the 
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assets, and the IIPs of both EMEs and advanced economies will show correspondingly lower 
gross assets and liabilities. Simultaneously, SWFs are to be turned into “Growth and 
Development Funds” (GDFs), investing in EMEs rather than advanced country assets. The 
GDFs thereby replace the allocative role of capital inflows.
9  
Foreign expertise may play various functions in the proposed CAM regime. For 
instance, the asset management of the GDFs may in principle be left to the very same fund 
managers that currently steer the foreign portfolio investments on behalf of foreign investors; 
and, for the sake of the argument, they might even be rewarded for their expertise by unchanged 
fee structures. Assuming that it makes sense to import their expert services to serve allocative 
efficiency, the point is that there is no need to import these services on the back of hot money 
inflows as footloose drivers of domestic liquidity creation. The potential role for foreign 
expertise may extend to advising the central bank on monetary policy and the financial stability 
authorities on financial regulation and supervision. Regarding the GDFs’ management, foreign 
expertise may be partly acquired through services import or direct investments, if that serves 
industry competition. The key point is that the liabilities structure of the GDFs has domestic 
ownership, effectively replacing foreign ownership of high-yielding EME assets appearing on 
the liabilities side of the EMEs’ IIP under the current self-insurance regime. Under the proposed 
CAM regime, the EME would pay for imported services and any earnings on direct investments, 
but it would no longer be burdened by the implicit price tag of self-insurance.   
The initial equity capital in the GDFs will be to the Treasury (on taxpayers’ behalf). 
Managing the GDFs’ liability structures (leverage) might include a role for the central bank and 
the financial stability authority. While produced at home in any case, liquidity creation can be 
steered in a more controlled fashion when the central bank enjoys the necessary policy space. 
The role of the EME authorities thus changes fundamentally. The central bank will no longer 
passively adapt its policy stance to conditions set at the center and have its liquidity policies 
driven by sterilization needs. Instead, with decoupling through CAM, the central bank can 
autonomously determine a monetary policy stance as warranted by domestic requirements. 
Domestic credit rather than reserve assets are the counterpart to monetary base growth.  
                                                            
9 In contrast to the scheme proposed here, D’Arista’s scheme of a publically controlled mutual fund continues to 
permit portfolio capital inflows, which assumes that such inflows are indeed needed (D’Arista 1999). The proposed 
scheme here is more like a financial market equivalent of a development bank, with the option of inviting foreign 
expertise in the stock picking.  18 
 
The key principles of the proposed CAM regime may then be spelled out. Ideally, only 
foreign direct investment inflows that match the recipient countries’ development goals should 
be allowed in. Selection may be stricter still in focusing on Greenfield investment only. If 
merger and acquisition inflows are believed to serve the transfer of foreign knowhow and 
management skills, a higher than 10 percent hurdle may be set so as to block disguised “hot 
money” (portfolio equity) inflows. Beyond concurrent FDI outflows and reasonable reserve 
accumulation the volume of qualifying FDI inflows determines the maximum size of any safely 
tolerable current account deficit. In this regard, CAM is similar to self-insurance, a different 
means toward the same end.  
Limiting the current account deficit is first of all a risk containment policy. Reliance on 
non-FDI inflows represents a hazardous gamble better to be avoided. Hot money-type private 
capital inflows primarily result in either reduced policy space–cum–financial fragility risks, or 
in bloated reserve holdings together with wasteful self-insurance premium payments. Setting up 
a CAM regime and redesigning SWFs as GDFs avoids these downsides while retaining any 
potential benefits associated with special expertise that may be in short supply domestically.  
It is misleading to associate a current account deficit with increased investment 
“financed by” foreign saving. Rather, the current account balance is an indicator of a country’s 
intertemporal consumption profile. In practice, a current account deficit may allow increased 
present consumption, but future consumption will be constrained by the impact of capital 
inflows on net investment income over time. Of course this trade-off also applies to FDI, but 
FDI is at least likely to contribute to the recipient country’s technological advancement and 
catching up, so that future incomes will be higher too, whether or not FDI actually means an 
increased investment rate. If a higher investment rate is the policy goal, this may be more 
reliably achieved by fostering domestic investment spending directly (which in turn may 
warrant higher exports to the extent that capital goods are imported). By definition, investment 
means foregoing present consumption. Ironically, countries that really cannot forego present 
consumption typically have no access to global finance anyway, and hence must rely on official 
development aid only.  
The current account balance also indicates the balance of growth stimuli a country 
derives from domestic demand versus net exports. History actually features some rather 
successful cases of countries running persistent current account surpluses during their fast 
catching-up phase (Germany, Japan, and China are examples).  Section 2 argued that the 19 
 
popularity of the “export-led growth” model with its policy focused on competitiveness 
represents a policy response to the hazards of financial globalization—a revealed preference for 
safety in the periphery that also has systemic implications. Enabling countries to manage 
domestic demand is a precondition for severing their reliance on export-led growth. CAM may 
therefore also be an effective way to discourage mercantilist (cum self-insurance) strategies. 
Given the aim of blocking hot money, the regime specifics and peculiar CAM 
techniques applied should be designed to suit countries’ specific structures and circumstances. 
Quantitative limits, administrative as well as price-based measures targeting financial 
instruments and transactions all have a role to play in shutting off foreign financing options of 
households and corporations for domestic activities and containing foreigners’ engagements 
beyond FDI and trade. Corporate and personal income tax codes, too, may be used for this 
purpose, as may the regime of financial regulation and prudential supervision. Macroprudential 
regulation aims at discouraging business practices and operations that result in excessive 
systemic risk—a negative externality signaling market failure. EMEs’ unchecked exposure to 
unfettered global finance is a foremost source of such underpriced risks. The proposed CAM 
regime is thus not distorting efficient markets, but addressing a market failure arising from 
unchecked financial globalization. As the licensing of parties eligible for conducting or 
facilitating cross-border financial transactions and their effective supervision are essential for 
effective CAM, foreign institutions must be required to operate as subsidiaries rather than 
branches and subject to full host-country regulation and supervision (UN 2010). Again, foreign 
expertise (IMF, World Bank, UNCTAD, for instance) may be helpful in all these matters. 
Domestic shortcomings in these areas are not an argument for but against financial 
globalization.  
The design of CAM regimes does not need to start from scratch. Focusing on the BRICs, the 
next section investigates how their respective approach to CAM conditioned these countries’ 
exposure and vulnerability to disturbances in global finance, especially during the global crisis 
and subsequent recovery. The aim is to identify CAM techniques that may serve to shield 
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Alongside reforming its exchange rate regime (creating a de facto dollar peg, officially a 
managed float), China established conditional current account convertibility and began opening 
its capital account in 1994; albeit gradually with FDI inflows only at first and FDI projects 
requiring approval by local governments. Non-FDI inflows required approval by the People’s 
Bank of China (PBoC) and any receipts had to be deposited in a specified account and could 
only be used for specified expenditures, conversion into RMB being generally disallowed. Since 
joining the World Trade Organization in December 2001, permission was granted to some 
foreign banks for undertaking business in RMB, to domestic investors for investing their own 
foreign exchange in B-shares, to qualified foreign institutional investors for investing in China’s 
financial markets, and to insurance companies for using their own foreign exchange to invest 
internationally.  
As the buildup of reserves soared in the mid-2000s, China applied “measures to promote 
balanced capital inflows and outflows” (PBoC 2008). This meant tightening controls on 
unwelcome inflows such as foreign banks’ external borrowing while facilitating certain private 
outflows, including firms’ overseas direct investments and banks’ and other qualified 
institutional investors’ overseas portfolio investments (Yu 2008). China’s CAM is to be seen 
within the context of a tightly regulated bank-based financial system, in which foreign banks 
continue to play only a marginal role (McMahon 2010). The banking system was characterized 
by fragilities until the mid-2000s, when key banks were re-capitalized. Left unscathed by the 
global financial crisis, China’s key banks rank among the world’s largest today. 
IIP, gross IIP, net reserves CA income yielddiff IIP, gross IIP, net reserves CA income yielddiff IIP, gross IIP, net reserves CA income yielddiff IIP, gross IIP, net reserves CA income yielddiff
1990 ‐0.75 ‐2.29 3.07 0.27 ‐2.16 ‐1.00
1991 ‐0.33 ‐2.17 3.24 0.21 ‐1.48 ‐1.38
1992 1.43 ‐1.87 1.31 0.05 ‐1.54 ‐1.34
1993 0.00 ‐2.16 ‐1.89 ‐0.21 ‐0.66 ‐1.31
1994 ‐0.19 ‐1.52 1.24 ‐0.19 ‐0.52 ‐1.10 10.70 5.37 2.35 2.83 ‐0.66
1995 ‐2.36 ‐1.44 0.22 ‐1.62 ‐1.51 ‐1.02 14.08 4.20 5.49 2.22 ‐1.08
1996 ‐2.77 ‐1.45 0.85 ‐1.45 41.37 ‐21.40 7.08 ‐1.57 ‐0.86 ‐0.19 13.07 1.76 3.91 2.77 ‐1.39
1997 ‐3.50 ‐1.88 3.88 ‐1.16 38.87 ‐19.14 7.05 ‐0.70 ‐0.83 ‐0.52 16.36 0.15 4.39 ‐0.02 ‐2.15
1998 ‐4.02 ‐2.33 3.09 ‐1.63 40.30 ‐18.56 7.68 ‐1.61 ‐0.85 ‐0.44 20.47 ‐1.61 4.51 0.08 ‐4.35
1999 ‐4.43 ‐3.29 1.95 ‐1.34 40.94 ‐16.89 8.50 ‐0.71 ‐0.81 ‐0.77 26.79 2.20 6.36 12.57 ‐3.94
2000 ‐3.77 ‐2.78 1.71 ‐1.22 41.81 ‐15.83 8.92 ‐0.96 ‐1.02 ‐1.32 166.71 24.85 10.77 18.04 ‐2.59 ‐4.33
2001 86.67 ‐47.93 6.49 ‐4.20 ‐3.57 ‐3.13 1.31 ‐1.45 44.59 ‐14.25 11.28 0.29 ‐0.84 ‐0.58 154.96 14.32 11.95 11.07 ‐1.38 ‐2.50
2002 91.23 ‐46.09 7.56 ‐1.53 ‐3.64 ‐3.34 2.44 ‐1.03 48.42 ‐11.64 14.64 1.37 ‐0.76 ‐1.22 156.40 10.77 13.85 8.44 ‐1.91 ‐2.91
2003 97.38 ‐49.06 8.87 0.75 ‐3.34 ‐2.89 2.80 ‐0.48 51.27 ‐7.77 18.06 1.47 ‐0.82 ‐2.08 155.65 0.91 17.88 8.23 ‐3.06 ‐4.00
2004 89.36 ‐44.73 7.95 1.76 ‐3.08 ‐3.16 82.11 14.53 32.25 3.55 ‐0.18 ‐1.49 54.79 ‐6.26 20.57 0.11 ‐0.59 ‐1.35 139.37 ‐1.80 21.07 10.07 ‐2.16 ‐2.99
2005 73.36 ‐35.57 6.04 1.57 ‐2.92 ‐4.12 90.60 18.32 36.84 7.13 0.47 ‐0.30 50.59 ‐5.86 18.56 ‐1.27 ‐0.82 ‐2.26 139.36 ‐4.12 23.86 11.08 ‐2.48 ‐3.26
2006 77.42 ‐33.73 7.85 1.25 ‐2.51 ‐2.89 101.02 23.60 39.84 9.34 0.56 ‐0.53 57.59 ‐6.57 19.51 ‐1.02 ‐0.69 ‐1.42 151.70 ‐3.89 30.68 9.56 ‐2.97 ‐3.62
2007 94.43 ‐40.29 13.20 0.11 ‐2.14 ‐1.32 104.29 34.00 44.28 10.64 0.74 ‐1.23 64.80 ‐6.49 23.90 ‐0.70 ‐0.57 ‐0.90 179.68 ‐11.56 36.84 5.98 ‐2.37 ‐1.95
2008 67.22 ‐17.35 11.85 ‐1.72 ‐2.48 ‐4.61 97.78 33.05 43.50 9.65 0.92 ‐0.68 59.51 ‐6.81 20.30 ‐2.46 ‐0.26 0.18 106.02 15.33 25.57 6.22 ‐2.94 ‐8.54
2009 98.74 ‐38.48 15.15 ‐1.54 ‐2.14 ‐2.08 102.28 36.55 49.21 5.96 0.87 ‐0.85 71.53 ‐9.94 22.92 ‐2.15 ‐0.53 ‐0.41 170.46 9.61 35.67 4.01 ‐3.21 ‐4.36
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the crisis. Only minor outflows from its reserve holdings were recorded during some months at 
the peak of the crisis. More corroborating evidence as to the effectiveness of China’s CAM 
regime arises from the fact that China’s monetary policy stance enjoys considerable 
independence from the US despite the RMB’s dollar-link (Ma and McCauley 2007).  
But other factors, too, played a role in enlarging China’s policy space. One important 
factor is that China has maintained very low inflation rates (at times deflation) while pursuing 
growth-oriented monetary policies; incomes policies have kept wages and productivity growth 
aligned (Flassbeck 2005). China thereby avoided larger interest rate differentials and 
correspondingly stronger incentives for hot money capital inflows. China’s favorable fiscal 
position at the outset of the GFC, not unrelated to its external surplus, offered the fiscal space to 
launch a large stimulus package.
12 Export surpluses had ballooned in the years prior to the crisis, 
but China has clearly started to rebalance away from export dependence since (Bibow 2010c).  
Finally, despite the country’s huge foreign reserves, China’s CAM regime has helped to 
keep the costs of self-insurance at bay. Since only a small part of China’s reserves was sourced 
from hot money inflows, the wasteful resource transfer resulting from inherently useless inflows 




The balance of payments crisis of 1991 marks a watershed in India’s economic policies. The 
crisis prompted an IMF structural adjustment program that included liberalization of the current 
and capital accounts. Prior to the crisis, official and private debt inflows provided the main 
sources of external finance. Since the crisis, India has aimed at blocking debt inflows, especially 
short-term ones. By contrast, India has gradually opened up to equity inflows, both FDI and 
portfolio, and more recently also began to relax restrictions on FDI outflows by Indian 
corporations. Portfolio inflows are managed through a “Foreign Institutional Investment” 
framework that requires registry of eligible foreign investors.  
                                                            
12 The stimulus included government spending and a vast lending program undertaken by state-owned banks (the 
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The ideological push for capital account liberalization presupposes a “saving gap” in the 
developing world to be closed by capital flows. In truth, catching-up in EMEs does not even 
require foreign saving. Certainly tolerating current account deficits beyond (net) FDI inflows is 
primarily hazardous, as compellingly evidenced by financial crises in EMEs. Limiting current 
account deficits through currency intervention and reserve accumulation is not costless either. 
The self-insurance boom of the 2000s has contributed to the perverse resource transfer from 
poor to rich.  Allowing access to unwarranted hot money flows only to park the destabilizing 
inflows in low-yielding reserve assets highlights that rent extraction is at the heart of financial 
globalization – as one aspect of the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of (net) capital flows 
from poor to rich. The analysis shows that any indirect benefits attributed to financial 
globalization as improving efficiency in resource allocation may be “synthesized” by a CAM 
regime that turns SWFs into GDFs. The first phase of financial globalization was characterized 
by fragilities and crises originating in EMEs. As defensive macroeconomic policies became en 
vogue in EMEs in the second phase, fragilities shifted to the core of the global financial system 
(still enjoying rent extraction engineered through financial globalization). The experience calls 
for a fundamental policy reorientation: globalization needs to be managed, especially capital 
flows. Financial globalization beyond FDI flows is simply not advisable.  
With proper reform of the international monetary and financial order unlikely at this 
point, CAM offers three major advantages to developing countries. First, it creates macropolicy 
space by decoupling from the monetary policy stance set at the center. Second, it avoids 
financial vulnerabilities arising from unfettered global finance. Third, it avoids the costs 
associated with bulging reserve holdings sourced from unwarranted capital inflows. For the 
world at large there is the additional advantage that CAM reduces the incentive for defensive 
macroeconomic policies on the part of the periphery—and thereby also its systemic counterpart: 
the need for “overspending” by the lead country.  
Studying the BRICs broadly covers the spectrum of CAM regimes in place. CAM 
contributed to China’s resistance to and ability to swiftly overcome the GFC, an open capital 
account to Russia’s heightened vulnerability and inability to overcome the crisis by domestic 
means. Traditionally cautious with regard to global finance, India has increased its external 
vulnerability in recent times through liberalization and toleration of larger current account 36 
 
deficits. As an especially attractive hot money destination given relatively high inflation and 
real interest rates, Brazil struggles moving in the opposite direction. Going forward, studying 
country experiences can inform the choice of techniques that work best under certain 














15 See also Edison and Reinhart 2001, Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo 2004, David 2007, 2008, Coelho and Gallagher 
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